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The recent case of Aid/Watch v Commissioner of Taxation1 has created sea changes in 
Australia in relation to charitable trusts, and as a result our Antipodean neighbours appear to 
be blazing trails in the evolution of charitable trusts, whilst at the same time, New Zealand 
resolutely remains entrenched in the annals of charitable trust history.  Can, and indeed 
should, New Zealand continue this traditional approach, as pressure mounts to explore more 
liberal interpretations of charitable trusts and political purposes?  This article explores the 
two jurisdictions and considers critically, in light of very recent controversial judgments, the 
diverging paths being taken by the jurisdictions.  Before any analysis of the proposition, there 
must first be a contextualisation of the legal position of charitable trusts and political 
purposes. 
 
The Legal Context 
 
The philosophy of charity is rooted firmly in the annals of history and the oldest active 
charity on record in the United Kingdom is documented as AD597.2  However, it would take 
many more centuries before an official system of regularisation would take effect; this began 
officially with the Statute of Elizabeth  known otherwise as the Statute of Charitable Uses 
1601.  This Act was primarily intended as “an accountability tool to ensure that charitable 
assets were applied to charitable ends”3 and has long since been repealed, although in the 
modern context it is its Preamble that is the cornerstone of that which may be construed as 
the principle of charitable law, and the yardstick against which charitable purposes are 
measured; if a purpose falls within the spirit and intendment of the Preamble,4 then prima 
facie, it is charitable.  The Preamble sets out the non-exhaustive list of purposes that are 
deemed to be charitable and these purposes include: 
 
• The relief of the aged, poor and impotent; 
• The maintenance of sick and maimed soldiers and mariners; 
• The repair of bridges and churches;  
• The marriage of poor maids. 
 
In the now seminal case of Commissioners for the Special Purposes of Income Tax v Pemsel,5  
Lord McNaghten set out the four heads of charity under which all charitable trusts must fall 
and “these heads are still the very foundation of charitable trusts in contemporary times.”6  
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The four heads of charity are most certainly well documented, although no review of charity 
is complete without their citation; they are as follows: 
 
• The relief of poverty; 
• The advancement of religion; 
• The advancement of education; 
• Any other purposes beneficial to the community not falling under any preceding 
heads. 
 
These four heads of charity have now been codified in New Zealand in the Charities Act 
2005 as follows:7 
 
In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, charitable purpose includes every charitable 
purpose, whether it relates to the relief of poverty, the advancement of education or religion, or 
any other matter beneficial to the community. 
 
A trust may fall within one or more of the four heads, however, there are still further tests that 
must be satisfied before a trust may be construed as being charitable under the Act.  Section 
5(2) of the Act requires that the purpose must be for the public benefit: 
 
   (a) the purpose of a trust, society, or institution is a charitable purpose under this 
Act if the purpose would satisfy the public benefit requirement apart from the fact that the 
beneficiaries of the trust, or the members of the society or institution, are related by blood;  
  
In other words “the purpose must be directed at benefiting the public or a sufficient section of 
the public.”8  In addition, the promotion of amateur sports may be a charitable purpose if it is 
the means by which a charitable purpose is pursued in accordance with s 5(1) of the Act as 
set out above.9  
 
The United Kingdom and Eire share similar statutory requirements,10 and Australia published 
the Charity Definition Inquiry in 2001, and has recently established the Australian Charities 
and Not-for-Profits Commission, which is tasked, inter alia, with developing policies and 
legislation for that sector.  In addition, the Australian Government is looking to introduce a 
statutory definition of charity. 
 
The Political Purpose Doctrine 
 
Whilst the purposes of an organisation must be charitable, if it also has non-charitable 
purposes, this will not necessarily be fatal to the acquisition of charitable status, which will 
be discussed in more detail in this article.  In New Zealand, the Charities Act 2005 states that 
any non-charitable purposes, for instance advocacy, must be ancillary to the charitable 
purposes of the organisation11 and ancillary is defined as:12 
 
   (a) ancillary, secondary, subordinate, or incidental to a charitable purpose of the 
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trust, society, or institution; and 
(b) not an independent purpose of the trust, society, or institution. 
 
For decades, case law, and more recently statute in a number of common law jurisdictions, 
has determined that a trust will be denied charitable status if its main or dominant purposes 
are political.  This is perhaps a surprising notion because politics and charities have had a 
long-standing relationship, beginning with the Statute of Elizabeth which was born out of a 
charged political environment.13  Even after the enactment of the Act, it is clear that politics 
and charity have remained intertwined, so “where a State may have failed in some respect, 
charity fulfilled that need as a consequence of that failing,”14 and depending on the 
Government and their policies at the time, the type and amount of charitable input varied.  It 
is clear however that the heads of charity as we know them now, as provided by Lord 
McNaghten in Pemsel, have their roots in government policy, irrespective of the government 
in power at the time, thus reinforcing the concept of the interrelationship between politics and 
charity.15  “Regardless however of the implicit affiliation between charities and politics”,16 
any organisation that seeks to “obtain or retain its charitable status…must avoid having 
political purposes and avoid engaging in political activity.”17  Re Wilkinson (Deceased)18 
clarified those purposes that may be construed as being political as: (move footnote 17 to 
here) 
 
Any purpose with the object of influencing the Legislature is a political purpose, and 
similarly, in my view, a purpose that the central executive authority be induced to act in a 
particular way in foreign relations or that the people be induced to accept a particular view or 
opinion as to how the central executive shall act in the foreign relations of this country, is, in 
the broadest sense, a political purpose[.] 
 
To understand this tense relationship therefore it is important contextualise the jurisprudence 
that underpins this doctrine. 
 
The case of De Themmines v De Bonneval19 is perhaps one of the earliest cases to consider 
the issue of charitable trusts and political purposes and the Court determined that: (move 
footnote 18 to here) 
 
 “it is against the policy of this country to encourage, by the establishment of a charity, the 
publication of any work which asserts the absolute supremacy of the pope…over the 
sovereignty of the state.”   
 
The gift therefore reverted to the donor.  Lord Parker of Waddington in the case of Bowman v 
Secular Society20 referred to the authority of De Themmines when he set out his now iconic 
observations regarding charitable trusts and political purposes: (move footnote 19 to here) 
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The abolition of religious tests, the disestablishment of the Church, the secularization of 
education, the alternation of the law touching religion or marriage, or the observation of the 
Sabbath, are purely political objects.  Equity has always refused to recognize such objects as 
charitable…a trust for the attainment of political objects has always been held invalid. 
 
However his Lordship clarified this statement, noting that trusts for political purposes are not 
illegal, because everyone is at liberty to advocate for changes in the law by lawful means, but 
rather trusts for political purposes cannot be held as valid charitable trusts because:21 
 
The Court has no means of judging whether a proposed change in the law will or will not be 
for the public benefit, and therefore cannot say that a gift to secure the change is a charitable 
gift. 
 
The cases of Bowman and De Themmines were cited as authority in McGovern v Attorney-
General,22 “where the Court was tasked with considering whether the purposes of a trust 
established by Amnesty International met the criteria for charitable status”23 and Slade J 
confirmed that “[t]rusts to promote changes in the law of England are generally regarded 
as…being non-charitable…”.24  Slade J’s dictum in McGovern represents a landmark in the 
development of the principle that political purposes cannot be construed as charitable and his 
Honour helpfully set out 5 types of trust that would be deemed trusts with political purposes 
that can be drawn in large part from Bowman, and also in some part from National Anti-
Vivisection Society v Inland Revenue Commissioners,25 which are as follows: 26 
 
1) Trusts that further the interests of a political party; 
2) Trusts to procure changes in the laws of England and Wales; 
3) Trusts to procure changes in the laws of foreign countries; 
4) Trusts to procure a reversal of government policy or of particular decisions of 
government authorities in England and Wales; and 
5) Trusts to procure a reversal of government policy or of a particular decision of 
government authorities in foreign countries. 
 
This categorisation appears very broad indeed, and is certainly more expansive that the 
Australian view, which will be addressed later in the paper, and as such is likely to catch a 
wide variety of activities.  However his Honour did assert that this is not an exhaustive list, 
although for the purposes of the particular judgment it would suffice in its exploration, thus 
leaving room for further additions should a Court feel it pertinent.  However, in qualifying 
this list, his Honour was at pains to note that this categorisation should only be directed at 
trusts whose purposes are political and should not be directed at trusts whose trustees employ 
political means to further the objects of a trust.27  
 
The judiciary of England and Wales therefore adopted a liberal approach in the interpretation 
of trusts whose purposes are political that could encompass a wide variety of activities of 
organisations.  However, whilst Australia certainly has adopted the doctrine of political 
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purposes, it does not appear to have done so with such enthusiasm as its Commonwealth 
cousin, which suggests that Australia has, even from early on, been nurturing the view that 
the doctrine is not set in concrete, although it could not necessarily have been foreseen how 
dramatic the change would actually be, and indeed whether such a change was justiciable.  It 
is to this issue that this paper now turns. 
 
Australia and the Political Purpose Doctrine 
 
Early Australian case law suggests a reluctant adoption of this doctrine28 and this perhaps 
paved an early path for the Australian courts to begin to follow a diverging road from New 
Zealand and English jurisprudence.  
 
In the case of Royal North Shore Hospital of Sydney v Attorney-General,29 one of the issues 
for the Court was whether a trust to provide a prize for the best essay promoting the extension 
of technical education in state schools was charitable.  Dixon J stated that the “case law 
dealing with the distinction between charitable purposes and political objects is in an 
unsatisfactory condition”30 thus affirming the discord felt by the Australian judiciary in 
relation to this doctrine.  However, his Honour could not deny that when a main purpose of a 
trust is to agitate for legislative or political change, then the Court will necessarily find it 
difficult to assess public welfare, even if the subject of change may be one of the three heads 
of charity.  If the purpose falls under the fourth class, “that of undefined purposes for the 
public good, the difficulty becomes even greater.”31  Regardless however of his Honour’s 
initial criticism of the scope of the political doctrine, it was apparent that he was also willing 
to set out a relatively broad interpretation of the doctrine, which perhaps foreshadows the 
later views of Slade J in McGovern.  Dixon J, in the instant case, referred specifically to trusts 
that fund a political party, or for the purpose of “influencing or taking part in the government 
of the country”, 32 or that seek to “establish a means of affecting or interfering with the 
government administration” and asserts that such trusts cannot be charitable. However, this is 
as far as his Honour is prepared to go in the expansion of the doctrine and he sought to 
distinguish those non-charitable trusts from those trusts that merely “mould opinion or spread 
doctrine on the subject of technical education.”33  This latter type of trust could be “regarded 
as coming within the objection that it is political in character.”34  Dixon J therefore 
acknowledged the authority of Bowman, albeit reluctantly, although his interpretation of the 
meaning of political certainly appears to fall somewhat short of the expansive meaning 
asserted by Slade J in McGovern, suggesting therefore that jurisprudentially, Australia was 
limiting the application of the doctrine, so enabling it to reject the doctrine at a later stage in a 
justifiable manner. 
 
Latham J in Royal North Shore also favoured an approach similar to that of his learned 
colleague Dixon J.   Latham J noted that a trust for the purpose of political agitation would be 
an invalid charitable trust and it would not be difficult to:35 
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Suggest reasons of public policy which would prevent recognition by the law of the 
establishment in perpetuity of a trust for the promotion of a particular political object as such, 
or for the maintenance and advocacy during the indefinite future of the principles of a 
particular political party. 
 
Indeed, such trusts “might become a public danger.”36 However, his Honour was cautionary 
about the influence of Bowman and asserted that it should not “be regarded as making it 
impossible to establish a trust as a charitable trust merely because the subject matter of the 
trust might be associated with political activity.”37  This is because legislation is a moveable 
feast and it is nigh on impossible to predict if a subject “might not at one time or another 
become the subject of political propaganda.”38  Thus whilst both Latham and Dixon JJ 
certainly acknowledged the relevance of the political doctrine, and appear to be bound to a 
certain extent, their full acceptance is notably absent and they appear to seek a limitation to 
its expansion in Australia.   
 
Rich J, in the case of Royal North Shore, took a more critical approach of the political 
doctrine than that of his learned colleagues, and stated that to find that the trust in question 
not charitable would be driving “to an absurd conclusion” based on on a doctrine that was 
already “vague and indefinite.” 39 His Honour was of the view that a gift for political 
purposes not being charitable cannot include “every public object even if religious, 
eleemosynary or educational ceases to be charitable if the State is concerned in or affected by 
the trust.”40    
 
Whilst the Judges in Royal North Shore supported slightly different interpretations of the 
applicability of the political doctrine in Australia, and all acknowledged the authority of 
Bowman, all were of the view that applying the doctrine to the set of particular facts would be 
stretching the doctrine too far and indeed, such an application may lead to political purpose 
extending to anything that may be associated with political activity.  Such a judgment 
suggests therefore an early fraying around the edges of the apron strings tying Australian 
jurisprudence to English jurisprudence on the political purpose doctrine.  The question 
therefore must be asked, how have later Australian cases reacted when faced with assessing 
this very doctrine and do these judgments lead inevitably to the startling conclusions in the 
Aid/Watch case? 
 
Justice Santow in the case of Public Trustee v Attorney-General of New South Wales41 lent 
his voice to the rising tide of criticism being levelled at the doctrine.  His Honour confirmed 
that “a trust to support a particular political party or its doctrines is clearly not charitable” and 
any purpose which is contrary to the established policy of the law also cannot be thought of 
as charitable,42  but acknowledged that this is still not a clear cut definition because it does 
not make a “distinction between supplementing the law when it may already be moving in a 
particular direction, and directly opposing its well established policy.”43  In addition, his 
Honour noted that the approach adopted by Slade J in McGovern has uncertain footing 
because, firstly, it “did not square with the unchallenged activism of prominent charities in 
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the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.”44  Secondly, Slade J relied on National Anti-
Vivisection as authority, and Lord Simonds in that case had already acknowledged that there 
“was an undoubtedly a paucity of judicial authority”45 for such an approach, with the case of 
Bowman being the strongest prior authority.  It is perhaps unsurprising therefore that 
Australia has struggled to accept fully the applicability of the doctrine of political purposes, 
and the recent outright rejection of the doctrine is perhaps therefore nothing more than a 
natural consequence of the evolution of the Australian jurisprudence of the doctrine. 
 
Santow J however was not yet complete in his challenge to the apparent political doctrine 
authority.  He asked: “[m]ust the pursuit of charitable objects by means of political agitation 
invalidate those objects?”46  Interestingly, support for this argument is found in Royal North 
Shore, where the Court suggested that the pursuit of charitable objects through political 
agitation would render a trust non charitable.47 However, a more flexible approach is to be 
found, perhaps surprisingly, in McGovern by Slade J, where he stated that “the mere fact that 
trustees may be at liberty to employ political means in further the non-political purposes of a 
trust does not necessarily render it non-charitable.”48  In the face of such apparent conflicting 
views, Santow J pragmatically attempted to define agitation and how it may be viewed in the 
context of charitable trusts:49 
 
Pressure for political change can range from direct lobbying of the government for legislative 
change to attempts to educate and persuade the public and change public opinion on a 
particular issue.  Whether such pressure for change is termed agitation with its pejorative 
overtone, propaganda…a campaign…or merely and legitimately education…may be to some 
extent in the eye of the beholder, influenced by tone and style. 
 
Thus agitation may encompass a number of actions and as a result may indeed allow a trust 
to be charitable.  In applying this multi-faceted definition to the instant case, Santow J 
confirmed that the objectives of the trust were to be achieved through public meetings and 
other means of influencing public opinion for the benefit of a disadvantaged group, this did 
not, in his Honour’s view, render the trust political.  It is suggested therefore that Santow J’s 
dictum is a logical attempt to set out a more comprehensive definition of a political trust as a 
result of reviewing the uncertain jurisprudence to date.  The author accepts that this is not a 
perfect, nor perhaps exhaustive, characterisation, but what it does do is provide more clarity 
in two respects: that of the action of agitation and also in relation to objects that reflect the 
direction in which the law is travelling.   
 
Such an approach also provides fertile grounds in which this approach may be planted and 
nurtured, and contemporary cases such as Aid/Watch, whilst at first sight are controversial, 
are perhaps the inevitable harvest of such a planting.  Indeed, it was the notion of agitation 
that was at the heart of the Aid/Watch decision, and perhaps therefore a fundamental piece in 
the jigsaw that enabled Australia to reject legitimately the political purpose doctrine in its 
entirety.   It is appropriate therefore to turn now to the case of Aid/Watch and address its 
impact on the jurisprudence of the political doctrine.  The paper will then assess New 
Zealand’s response to Australia’s methodology and consider whether the antipodean cousins 
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may actually be sharing the jurisprudential approach as opposed to following apparently 
diverging paths. 
 
The Aid/Watch Decision 
 
Aid/Watch is an organisation that seeks to promote the efficient use of national and 
international aid directed to the relief of poverty.  Its activities include research and 
campaigns.  These campaigns are designed to stimulate public debate and to bring about 
changes in government policy and activity in relation to the provision of foreign aid.50  The 
organisation has been the subject of a rollercoaster of decisions through the courts.   
 
In October 2006, the Commissioner of Taxation revoked the organisation’s charitable status, 
but in 2008, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) reversed that decision.51  The 
President of the AAT, Downes J held that Aid/Watch fell within the first and second Pemsel 
heads, and if it did not fall within those, then it would also fall under the fourth head.52  In 
addition, it “was also found to be emphasising particular priorities in an existing government 
policy rather than challenging government policy, and so did not fall afoul of the political 
purposes doctrine.”53  The AAT also confirmed that promoting the effectiveness of aid 
advanced the relief of poverty, even though it did not directly relieve poverty, because the 
relieving of poverty is so fundamental to aid.54   
 
However, in 2009, the Full Federal Court reversed the AAT’s decision.  Whilst the Court did 
agree with the AAT that the indirect efficiency of aid delivery would relieve poverty,55 it 
rejected the AAT’s view that its purposes were not political:56 
 
In its view, Aid/Watch’s objectives could only be achieved by campaigning to alter 
government policy, and its primary goal was to influence the government.  Its attempt to 
persuade the government necessarily involved criticism of, and an attempt to change, 
government activity and policy… 
 
As a result the Federal Court held that Aid/Watch’s main purposes and activities were 
political and thus not charitable.  Interestingly, the Court rejected the notion that “undue 
emphasis” on political means could disqualify an organisation from charitable status,57 thus 
providing further clarity on the interpretation of political purpose.  Nevertheless, the Federal 
Court was clear that it was bound by the political purposes doctrine.  It noted that:58 
 
The “natural and probable” consequence of Aid/Watch’s activities is an effect on public 
opinion and then on government opinion.  Relief from poverty, however, is not either a 
natural or probable consequence precisely because governments have to take into account 
factors that institutions such as Aid/Watch do not need to consider. 
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The Court did not doubt that Aid/Watch’s efforts on one level were not in conflict with 
government policy because there was no suggestion that the Government was not committed 
to delivering aid efficiently, and nor that it did not give due regard to environmental 
concerns.  On another level however, Aid/Watch’s concern was that the delivery of aid 
should “conform to its view of the best way to achieve these objects.”59  In doing so, 
Aid/Watch could not take into account “that government and its agencies inevitably have to 
make choices in determining where, how and how much aid is to be delivered.”60  Relying on 
Young CJ’s view in Attorney General (NSW) v NSW Henry George Foundation Ltd,61 the 
Federal Court confirmed that whilst there may be weaknesses in the political doctrine “it 
would seem that the main or dominant purpose test is where the law has reached at the 
present time.” (move footnote 59 here)  As a result, the Court concluded that the AAT erred 
in concluding that Aid/Watch’s main purpose was not political, and accordingly determined 
that its main purpose was political, thus not charitable.62   
 
The conclusion of the Federal Court went someway to reaffirming the notion of the political 
purpose doctrine in Australia, and whilst acknowledging that its foundations were not 
necessarily as firmly grounded as would be judicially acceptable, Australia was still bound by 
those concepts, and the issue of whether a political purpose is the dominant purpose or 
subsidiary would be a key consideration for a Court in determining charitable status.  
 
Regardless, however, of the Federal Court’s clarifying view regarding this matter, in 2010 the 
High Court of Australia ploughed a new furrow relating to the political purpose doctrine and 
uprooted any notion that the Bowman line of authority may be firmly established in 
Australian jurisprudence.  The majority of 5 judges overturned the Federal Court’s decision, 
with Heydon and Kiefel JJ in dissent.  The Court spent time setting out Australia’s 
jurisprudence regarding Bowman and their starting point was that the remarks of Lord Parker 
in Bowman “were not directed to the Australian system of government established and 
maintained by the Constitution itself.”63   This then, the Court explained, “provides a 
significant consideration in deciding the content of the common law of Australia respecting 
trusts for political purposes.”64  Their Honours confirmed that Bowman has received little 
attention over the years in Australia,65 and indeed rejected the notion that the political 
purpose doctrine should apply in Australia because the doctrine was in tension with the 
Constitution.   
 
This was explained as follows. The Australian Constitution mandates “a system of 
representative and responsible government with a universal adult franchise”66 and it provides 
for constitutional change through popular referenda and so is assumed to be indispensable 
regarding communication between the executive, legislature and electors on government and 
policy matters.  The very system itself therefore requires agitation in order for legislative and 
policy changes to occur; this is then presumed to be for the public welfare.67  Thus, Santow 
J’s views in the Public Trustee case regarding the notion of agitation falling outside the 
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political purposes doctrine are given credence here by the High Court, and support the 
author’s view that the Court is legitimising the rejection of the doctrine.  
 
This was a bold, and surprising, move by the High Court to use the Constitution in such a 
manner, because the “case extended an existing constitutional principle relating to freedom of 
political communication from its electoral base into the protection of the political activities of 
non-government organisations”;68 its effect may be long lasting and far reaching, and already 
New Zealand is beginning to feel the first shock waves, which will be addressed shortly. 
 
Australia’s Constitution does not contain a Bill of Rights, nor an express recognition of 
freedom of speech but the High Court has acknowledged that the Constitution implies that 
Australian parliaments cannot pass laws that may unduly interfere with citizens’ 
communications about political matters.69 Sections 7 and 24 of the Constitution state that 
members of the Federal Parliament must be “directly chosen by the people.”  This implied 
freedom takes precedence over statute or common law and if “it can be shown that the 
freedom applies, it trumps everything else.”70  This freedom is now enabling the courts to 
develop the common law, as considered in Lange v Australian Broadcasting Commission,71 
where the High Court considered defences that are appropriate with regard to dealing with 
speech and political figures.  However, whilst the courts may be at liberty to use this 
freedom, it is rarely used, and when it is, it is narrowly construed,72 hence academic surprise 
at its explicit application in the case of Aid/Watch.   
 
In widening the application of freedom of speech, the Court accepted Aid/Watch’s 
submission that the “generation by lawful means of public debate concerning the efficiency 
of foreign aid directed to the relief of poverty, itself is a purpose beneficial to the community 
within the fourth head of Pemsel.”73  So the High Court has taken “freedom from its electoral 
context as provided by ss 7 and 24 of the Constitution in to the charitable realm”74 and in 
doing so, rejected the notion that the Bowman line of authority underpinning the political 
purpose doctrine should apply in Australia.  This does mean that should a “statute seek to 
close down public advocacy or ‘agitation’ for legislative or political changes…there may be 
good grounds to argue that this breaches the Constitution.”75   The High Court failed to 
clarify what is actually meant by agitation in this context although it is thought to include 
publication of critical comment that would generate support for legal and policy change, 
although the Court did only speak of agitation for legislative and policy change, as opposed 
to agitation outside of such parliamentary and government realms.76   
 
Whilst the High Court in Aid/Watch could be said to have removed “a doctrinal anomaly and 
the muddle it engendered”,77 there are still concerns with this radical removal of the common 
law doctrine.  At no stage did the majority in the High Court go beyond the stating of the 
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common law doctrine of political purposes in the United Kingdom, Canada and the United 
States and whether they are ancillary or subsidiary to the trust’s overall purposes.  As 
addressed earlier, the subject of non-charitable purposes, and clearly political purposes fall 
under this head, has always been of key importance to any court and Charities Commissions 
in determining whether an organisation is charitable: if a non-charitable purpose is ancillary 
to the main purpose of the organisation, then this will not automatically be fatal in obtaining 
charitable status. The Full Federal Court was certainly compelled to consider the issue of 
non-charitable purposes, and confirmed that the main purpose of Aid/Watch was to persuade 
government to its point of view and to bring about policy and government change, thus this is 
political activity, and its main activity.78  However, once the High Court set out the political 
purpose doctrine for various jurisdictions, it did not provide any discussion regarding the 
issue of non-charitable purposes being ancillary or dominant, and instead asserted that the 
line of authority stemming from Bowman was not directed to the Australian system of 
government.79  To ignore this fully established jurisprudence was surprising, although 
perhaps the High Court believed that such a discussion was of no consequence because it was 
clear in its assertion that the political purpose doctrine no longer had a place in Australian 
common law.   
 
What this does mean, however, is that there is now no restriction on the amount of advocacy 
in which organisations may engage, and whilst some organisations may previously have been 
uncertain as to whether they were engaging in dominant or ancillary amounts of advocacy, 
the Aid/Watch case has now removed the chilling effect about which the charitable sector has 
complained, and has allegedly prevented charities from engaging in advocacy for fear of 
losing their charitable status,80 at least in Australia for the time being. 
 
Whilst the method that the Court used to undermine the application of the political purpose 
doctrine stemming from Bowman in Australia might have been surprising, the actual rejection 
of the Bowman line of authority is perhaps not at all surprising, given the reluctance of the 
judiciary over the years in its applicability.  Santow J’s dictum in particular, in Public 
Trustee, as discussed amongst others, was undoubtedly instrumental in helping to sow the 
seeds in the soil of Australian jurisprudence that had already been tilled by previous 
Australian cases when considering the political purpose doctrine.  The political purpose 
doctrine specific to Australia has now successfully taken root.   What then are the 
implications for such new growth?  
 
Obviously the most profound consequence of the Aid/Watch decision is that “advocacy has 
been accepted as a legitimate charitable activity”81 and so for the majority of the Court, 
where a charity’s purpose is to agitate for reform to legislation, a Court now does not need to 
concern itself with whether the law reform is meritous, or otherwise, before determining if 
the purpose is a charitable one.82  It will be recalled earlier in the paper that courts have 
historically been very reluctant to determine the matter of public benefit relating to political 
purpose because the courts are in no position, and have no means, of judging the merits of 
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that particular law reform.83  In the Aid/Watch case however, the Court clarified 2 points: 
firstly, the rule against political purposes has been repealed, and secondly, by finding that the 
public benefit test might be applied in political purposes cases without actually addressing the 
issue of whether the change in law might be beneficial, the Court managed to side step the 
whole issue.   In effect, what the majority in Aid/Watch determined was that “generating 
public debate about governmental activities is apt to produce public benefit because of its 
effects on the political culture of liberal democracy in Australia.”84  So therefore the High 
Court legitimised the rejection of the doctrine and this could be said to be a natural 
consequence of the judicial disquiet that had been reflected in the antecedent judgments over 
the years. 
 
Whilst the decision of Aid/Watch has been welcomed for many reasons,85 not least because it 
has opened up the doors for a wide range of organisations to take advantage of being 
charitable without concern about engaging in advocacy, and those organisations undoubtedly 
will make important contributions in fighting for public welfare in matters such as health, 
poverty and suffering,86 jurisprudentially there are concerns that the decision may not be so 
welcome.  
 
It was noted earlier that the AAT found that Aid/Watch relieved poverty and advanced 
education, and may otherwise fall under the fourth Pemsel head, with which the Full Federal 
Court agreed, although they determined that it was political.  However, the High Court stated 
that the organisation’s purposes fell within the fourth Pemsel head and provided no 
explanation for rejecting the earlier characterisations of the AAT and the Federal Court.  It is 
unsettling that the High Court felt confident enough to sweep away decades of jurisprudence 
regarding political purpose and charitable status by basing its decision superficially on its 
own constitutional framework,87 thus making a landmark decision, whilst failing to provide 
legal clarity on fundamental charitable matters.  
 
Further issues arise in relation to the actual meaning of “public debate” and “political 
activities”.  It is not clear whether “’political activities’ other than generating public debate, 
such as private lobbying of government officials or political campaigning”88 may be 
charitable, and neither is it clear whether public benefit “lies primarily in the generation of 
public debate itself”89 or “in the charitable purpose which is being debated”,90 or perhaps a 
combination of the both.  So the Aid/Watch decision is a double edged sword: on the one 
hand it has swept away decades of jurisprudential uncertainty and criticism in one fell swoop 
in Australia, and opened up the gates for greater freedom of expression and a dynamic change 
in the charitable industry, and on the other, it has provided unsettling legal uncertainty with 
regard to the continued meaning of political activity and charitable purpose.  What then has 
been its influence in New Zealand? 
 
Are There Fertile Grounds in New Zealand for New Growth? 
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New Zealand did not have long to wait before the effects of the case of Aid/Watch were being 
felt in the courts.  The case of Draco Foundation (NZ) Charitable Trust v The Charities 
Commission91 was the first case in New Zealand to consider the applicability of Aid/Watch in 
its own jurisdiction.  This case arose as a result of the Charities Commission of New Zealand 
(as it was) rejecting Draco Foundation’s application for charitable status.  Prior to the 
publication of the decision, my view was that the High Court would deny the applicability of 
the principles enunciated in the Aid/Watch case in New Zealand because:92 
 
• The High Court in Aid/Watch made it clear that the Australian constitution allows for 
such political agitation and that agitation provides public benefit; and  
• New Zealand does have a general doctrine that would deny organisations charitable 
status if their non-charitable purposes are more than ancillary to their main purposes. 
 
These views were given support in the judgment of Young J in Draco.  The purpose of the 
Draco Foundation is to protect and promote democracy and natural justice in New Zealand.  
It does this, inter alia, through research and engaging in public debate on results; raising 
awareness of an involvement in the democratic process; organising conferences and making 
public comment.  It also provides free resources online for citizens as well as providing 
merchandise, training and paid access to sections of its website.  The appellant submitted that 
its purposes are educational, therefore they fall within the head of advancement of education 
and also that through moral improvement they are charitable under the fourth head of 
charitable purpose.  The appellant denied that its main purposes are political.93   
 
The key matter for this paper is the consideration of the partisan or political material.  The 
Commission determined that the material available on the websites amounted to propaganda 
under the guise of education, thus offending the rule that a trust for political purposes cannot 
be charitable.94  The Court confirmed that much of the partisan material was an attempt by 
the Foundation to persuade local or central government to a particular point of view, and 
publicising one side of a debate is not advancing education.   
 
The Court referred to the Canadian case of Action by Christians for the Abolition of Torture v 
The Queen in Right of Canada,95 where the Court held that attempts to sway the government 
by writing of letters and other methods on contemporary matters was a political activity.  
However, the appellant submitted that the High Court of New Zealand should adopt the 
Australian approach as set out in Aid/Watch.   This, Draco stated, would allow the 
organisation to pursue its political agenda through advocacy without falling foul of the 
political purpose doctrine.96 
 
The Court did acknowledge that Draco’s purpose to enhance and maintain communication 
between electors and legislators and executive officials does contribute to the public welfare 
through public debate, and therefore prima facie, is charitable.  However, the Court was very 
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clear that whilst Australia has declared that the general doctrine that excludes political objects 
from being charitable is not applicable to Australia, such a doctrine is still very much alive 
and well in New Zealand, and whilst Aid/Watch sought to cut a swathe through the Bowman 
principles that underpin this doctrine, New Zealand is still bound by Bowman, and as such, is 
still tending to that well established principle.97   
 
In addition, the Court noted that there may be other reasons as to why Aid/Watch would not 
have application in the instant case:98 
 
That includes the proposition that Aid/Watch applies only to those cases where the charitable 
purpose involves relief of poverty.  And secondly, that the decision in Aid/Watch is reliant 
upon Australian constitutional principles not applicable in New Zealand. 
 
However, whilst Young J did acknowledge that the new line of Australian authority may not 
have applicability in New Zealand in the Draco case, there was no requirement actually to 
assess the strength of that reasoning because Bowman identifies the law in New Zealand, thus 
rendering that examination unnecessary.   Young J therefore sent out a rather clouded 
message.  On the one hand, his Honour was clear that the Bowman line of authority that 
underpins the political purpose doctrine remains good law in New Zealand, and as such, the 
seeds of change from Australia should not be allowed to germinate on New Zealand soil.  On 
the other hand, this acknowledgement was not entirely grounded on firm footing.  His 
Honour acknowledged that whilst the New Zealand method of governance and constitution 
may preclude such political agitation from being charitable, and that Aid/Watch may only be 
applicable in cases relieving poverty, he was not prepared to assess the strength of either of 
those propositions, therefore leaving the gate open for further judicial examination, and 
indeed propagation.   
 
However, perhaps this is not such a surprising approach.  This was the first time that a Court 
in New Zealand has had the opportunity to examine the contemporary Australian 
jurisprudence of charitable trusts and political activity in the context of New Zealand, and 
whilst it is clear that Australia has been voicing its vexation regarding the doctrine for many 
decades, New Zealand has been more conservative in its application of the doctrine.  It is, 
perhaps, entirely reasonable that the Court should therefore conservatively reject the 
Australian jurisprudence whilst also acknowledging its possible applicability. After all, 
charitable trusts have always been a moveable feast and there are many modern day charities 
that would not have been conceivable a mere 100 years ago. 
 
The next much awaited instalment in the chapter of the political purposes doctrine in New 
Zealand came about later in 2011 in the High Court case of Re Greenpeace New Zealand 
Plc,99 where again, the case of Aid/Watch was a point of consideration. 
 
Greenpeace New Zealand Inc’s overall purpose is to promote a philosophy that encompasses 
the protection and preservation of nature and the environment and the organisation had 
benefited from being charitable until the Charities Act 2005 came in to force.  When that 
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occurred, organisations were obliged to apply to the Charities Commission100 for registration 
as a legal charitable entity.  The Commission declined Greenpeace’s application on the basis 
of its political activity.  The appeal “was framed as whether a modern law of charities ought 
to exclude from registration societies that promote charitable objectives through the use of 
advocacy.”101   Heath J confirmed that the genesis of the exemption of political activities 
from charitable purposes evolved from Bowman, and affirmed the notion of the 
inapplicability of political objects in relation to charitable trusts, and very specifically to the 
matter of persuading the public towards peace as opposed to war by undertaking a specific 
course of action as per the objects of Greenpeace.   
 
His Honour then clearly acknowledged the applicability of the Bowman line of authority in 
New Zealand, stating that Bowman was applied in Molloy v Commissioner of Inland 
Revenue,102 and explicitly affirmed that the Court was bound by that decision,103 thus 
dispelling any notion that New Zealand might follow Australia’s novel jurisprudence of 
rejecting that line of authority.   Heath J confirmed that at the time of the Molloy decision, 
which concerned a donation to the Society for the Protection of the Unborn Child, where the 
donee claimed that she was entitled to deduct that sum from her assessable income for that 
year, that “there was vigorous public debate over the possibility of liberalisation of the law 
relating to abortion”,104 and indeed, the starting point for determining whether the political 
activity exception should apply were Lord Parker’s observations in Bowman.   In the Molloy 
case, Somers J stated that those who engage in advocating for changing the law and those 
who vigorously oppose changing the law in relation to abortion are both engaged in carrying 
out political activities.105   As a result “the inability of the Court to judge whether a change in 
the law will or will not be for the public benefit…must be as applicable to the maintenance of 
an existing provision as to its change.”106   
 
In making reference to this, Heath J in Greenpeace was clearly entrenching the concept that 
the Bowman line of authority was explicitly applicable as part of New Zealand jurisprudence, 
and in particular, to the factually similar political undertakings as addressed in Molloy and 
Greenpeace.  As if there could have been any doubt as to that matter, Heath J turned his 
attention to the slightly later case of Re Collier (deceased),107 where a testatrix had left her 
estate to promote, inter alia, the ideas of world peace and to enabling people to die with 
dignity; in particular the Voluntary Euthanasia Society was deemed to satisfy the latter 
object.  Hammond J in Re Collier did not discuss Molloy, although his Honour did explore 
the issue of political trusts and he set out 3 rationales for the doctrine, although his view was 
that two of them were “distinctly debateable.”108   
 
The first rationale set out by Hammond J in Re Collier, as cited in Greenpeace, was that “a 
coherent system of law ‘could scarcely admit that objects which are inconsistent with its own 
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provisions are for the public welfare.’”109  However, as noted by Heath J, Hammond J in Re 
Collier referred to the alternative viewpoint as set out in the United States of America where 
it is commonplace for Judges to make suggestions about changes in the law, “whether in 
judgments or writing extra-curially.”110 
 
The second rationale set out by Hammond J in Re Collier was the category of prohibited 
political charitable trusts that perpetuate advocacy of a particular point of view – otherwise 
termed as propaganda trusts.111  However, Hammond J also criticised this view point and 
thought it contentious because whilst outright disobedience to the law is illegal and obviously 
not charitable, where the Courts move beyond that explicit issue, then perhaps it is more of a 
grey area.  This is because in reality judges are consistently making decisions about the 
“worth” of bequests,112 therefore to say that judges are not in a position to make judgments 
about the value of a matter is not strictly accurate. 
 
The third rationale cited by Hammond J in Re Collier “related to the rejection of trusts to 
support a political party.  This is based on the undesirability for the advantages of charity to 
be conferred on trusts which overtly ‘secure…a certain line… of political administration and 
policy.’”113  Hammond J could see no contention with this particular rationale, although 
clearly his Honour was troubled by the other two rationale.     
 
It is obviously no coincidence that Heath J took such pains to emphasise the views of 
Hammond J in Re Collier to this extent and indeed, his Honour in Greenpeace stated 
explicitly that his learned colleague “considered that the general political activity exception 
was based on questionable foundations.”114  Whilst Heath J set out clearly the discomfort felt 
by Hammond J about the actual doctrine, his Honour also then revealed that his learned 
colleague “found himself required by authority to apply it, in the circumstances of the 
case.”115  The use of the words “in the circumstances of the case” suggest that should 
Hammond J have found himself outside of those constraints, he would not have felt so bound 
by a principle in which he had so little faith, and therefore may well have chosen to plough 
new jurisprudential furrows.   
 
However, whilst Hammond J had “considerable sympathy for the viewpoint which holds that 
a Court does not have to enter into the debate at all”,116 rather a Court could “sieve out 
debates which are for improper purposes”,117 and then could indeed leave “the public to 
debate to lie where it falls, in the public arena…”;118 he could see “no warrant to change 
these well-established principles.”119 
 
Here then, Heath J in Greenpeace provides evidence of some quiet discontent regarding the 
political doctrine in New Zealand jurisprudence, much as Australia did some years 
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previously.  However, there is one clear difference between the two jurisdictions: New 
Zealand, whilst dissatisfied with the jurisprudence, has been unable to shake the shackles still 
tying it to the doctrine stemming from the Bowman line of authority, and whilst Australia had 
been quietly sowing the seeds of a new line of authority ready to be harvested so readily in 
Aid/Watch, as addressed earlier in the article, there appears, prima facie, to be little fertile soil 
for a new line of authority to grow in which in New Zealand due to its rigid adherence to that 
doctrine. 
 
However, Heath J then turned his attention to the decision in Aid/Watch.  His Honour 
confirmed that Aid/Watch’s activities contributed to the public welfare and were for purposes 
beneficial to the community within the fourth Pemsel head, and the activities should not be 
subject to the disqualification political rule because of the contemporary structure of the 
Australian system of governance.  Interestingly, Heath J made a point of referencing the 
dissenting Judge’s views, those of Heydon and Kiefel JJ.  The former was “critical of the 
majority’s view that those who encourage energetic action to achieve a particular political 
goal could be seen as educating the public on the pros and cons of a particular political 
issue.”120  In particular, Heydon J, similarly to Heath J, relied on Hammond J’s dicta in Re 
Collier, and took the view that Aid/Watch “intended to persuade people to a particular point 
of view; there was no attempt to provide a balanced assessment of opposing views from 
which knowledge could be accumulated and independent decisions made.”121   
 
Kiefel J took a slightly different approach, and whilst her Honour had no issue with the 
political nature of the organisation and was not convinced that this should disqualify it from 
achieving charitable status, “she was influenced by the way in which Aid/Watch had targeted 
the policies and practices of inter-governmental institutions, the Australian Government and 
its allies, as opposed to encouraging rational debate.”122  In other words, her Honour argued 
that if its purposes were for the public benefit, then this would meet the charitable 
requirements, however, its activities are not directed to that end because its purposes are 
directed to the acceptance of the Government and its agencies of Aid/Watch’s views on the 
provision of aid, not that of public debate about the provision of aid.   
 
Interestingly, Heath J in Greenpeace gave no specific view about the considerations of the 
dissenting Judges, but it is submitted that by their very inclusion, his Honour clearly felt 
those views were of merit.  The fact that those views reflect, at least in part, his Honour’s 
own submissions, suggests that Heath J is emphasising the still very real consideration that 
the doctrine is valid, and indeed that whilst Australia may have scythed away the political 
purpose doctrine underpinned by Bowman, the dissenting opinions still have some validity.  
So leaving questions hanging about his own view on the dissenting opinions in Aid/Watch, 
Heath J acknowledged the judgment of Re Draco and its rejection of the Aid/Watch decision 
in New Zealand.   
 
His Honour highlighted the other two reasons why Ronald Young J in Re Draco believed that 
Aid/Watch ought not to be applied in New Zealand: that it should only be applied to cases 
where the charitable purpose involved the relief of poverty, and that Aid/Watch was reliant on 
the Australian constitution, which were not applicable in New Zealand.123  Heath J refrained 
from comment on Ronald Young J’s point regarding the relief of poverty exclusion, and 
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instead, focused his thoughts on the matter of the purportedly differing political systems and 
stated that he has:124  
 
…no real concerns that the political system in Australia ought to bring about a different 
conclusion, having regard to our mixed member proportional system of parliamentary 
election, our reliance on select committees to enable policy to be property debated and the 
existence of ss 13 and 14 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, dealing respectively 
with freedom of thought, conscience and religion, and freedom of expression. 
 
Whilst his Honour felt it important enough to comment that the system of New Zealand 
governance actually may support the applicability of Aid/Watch, his Honour went no further 
in his investigation, and merely stated that the question should be left open for consideration, 
“in an appropriate case, by the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court.”125    
 
This then is reminiscent of earlier Australian cases where the courts expressed their 
discontent with the political purposes doctrine and impliedly began legitimising the final 
rejection of the doctrine.  Is New Zealand therefore to follow that path? 
 
The Court of Appeal case of Greenpeace of New Zealand Incorporated,126 which will be 
addressed shortly, suggests not yet, as the legal ground is not yet fertile enough to encourage 
any growth at the immediate time, and this is supported by Heath J’s view in the High Court 
Greenpeace case where he felt “constrained to apply the full extent of the Bowman line of 
authority on the basis that I am bound to do so by the Court of Appeal decision in Molloy.”127  
However, his Honour also felt bound to add explicitly that in “modern times, there is much to 
be said for the majority judgment in Aid/Watch.”128 
 
Heath J therefore presents a rather confused and mixed picture.  Firstly, his Honour provides 
confirmation that political purpose doctrine underpinned by Bowman is applicable in New 
Zealand, but only because he felt bound by the Court of Appeal decision of Molloy.  
Secondly, whilst his Honour clearly felt it necessary to highlight the dissenting views in 
Aid/Watch, there was no explicit appraisal of those views, thus inviting questions as to 
whether the Bowman line of authority is finding its footing rather becoming loose in New 
Zealand jurisprudential soil.   Thirdly, his Honour failed to clarify one of the points raised by 
Ronald Young J, that of whether Aid/Watch is specific only to relief of poverty cases, and 
additionally, that New Zealand governance principles may actually allow Aid/Watch to be 
applied now in Aotearoa.   Indeed, it has been argued that the Aid/Watch principles could be 
mounted in any democratic country.129 If that is correct, then any subsequent appeals should 
provide some evidence as to whether New Zealand could legitimately reject the political 
purpose doctrine, in line with Australia.   
 
Therefore it was with great anticipation that the author awaited the judgment in the very 
recent appeal case of Greenpeace of New Zealand Incorporated to the Court of Appeal.  It is 
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to that judgment that this paper now turns to explore whether New Zealand is adopting a 
more liberal approach regarding charitable trusts and political purposes. 
 
As the Court of Appeal stated, “the nature and purposes of Greenpeace are best understood 
from its objects,”130 and it was two of these objects that were of issue to the Charities 
Commission (now the Department of Internal Affairs - Charities).  These two objects read at 
the time as:131 
 
2.2 Promote the protection and preservation of nature and the environment, including oceans, 
lakes, rivers and other waters, the land and the air and flora and fauna everywhere and 
including but not limited to the promotion of conservation, disarmament and peace. 
 
2.7 Promote the adoption of legislation, policies, rules, regulations and plans which further 
the objects of the Society and support the enforcement or implementation through political or 
judicial processes, as necessary. 
 
The Court of Appeal then heard advice that the Board of Greenpeace had resolved to 
recommend to a general meeting of Greenpeace that these objects be amended, and now 
read:132 
 
2.2 Promote the protection and preservation of nature and the environment, including oceans, 
lakes, rivers and other waters, the land and the air and flora and fauna everywhere and 
including but not limited to the promotion of conservation, disarmament and peace, nuclear 
disarmament and the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction. 
 
2.7 Promote the adoption of legislation, policies, rules, regulations and plans which further 
the objects of the Society listed in clauses 2.1-2.6 and support their enforcement or 
implementation through political or judicial processes, as necessary, where such promotion 
or support is ancillary to those objects. 
 
As a result therefore, the proposed amendments had a significant impact on the specific 
issues raised at this appeal.133 
 
The Court of Appeal noted that whilst there have indeed been significant developments in the 
law of charitable trusts since the prohibition on political purposes doctrine, “the rationale for 
the prohibition has not necessarily been undermined.”134  In the Court’s view there is little 
doubt that, as with Australia and Canada, New Zealand could be “described as a modern 
participatory democracy with well-developed constitutional arrangements for public 
involvement.”135  In addition, New Zealand also has a Bill of Rights that protects freedom of 
thought, religion, conscience and expression.136  All of which clearly far removes this 
jurisprudence from the English jurisprudence of over 100 years ago.137  Nonetheless, the 
Court believed it of utmost importance to “distinguish between exercising those rights to 
support purposes which are recognised as primarily charitable and pursuing purely political 
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purposes”,138 and the Court explicitly remarked that it was not prepared to depart from the 
decision of the Court in the Molloy case, which “established that a society established for 
contentious political purposes could not be said to be established principally for charitable 
purposes.”139   
 
What is interesting is the explicit use of the words contentious political purposes, leaving the 
possibility open, therefore, of political purposes without contention as being broadly 
acceptable within the charitable trusts jurisprudence.  Indeed, the Court goes on to 
acknowledge that the prohibition on political trusts, as entrenched by s 5 of the Charities Act 
2005, has “produced some continuing and anomalous results, which have led to criticism and 
suggestions for reform.”140  Nevertheless, the Court was quite clear, the prohibition on 
political objects is part of the current law of New Zealand and it was not persuaded “that 
there are good grounds for overriding it.”141   
 
Whilst this then provides evidence that New Zealand is still supportive of the entrenched 
approach towards political purpose trusts, which has been eschewed by our Antipodean 
cousins, the Court then appeared to muddy the waters once again.  In their view, New 
Zealand should adopt the approach of Australia with regard to the use of the term 
“charitable”, where it “was to be understood by reference to its source in the general law as it 
was developed in Australia ‘from time to time’”.142  The Court did add, however, that any 
development in the law “must be consistent with and constrained by the provisions of the 
Act.”143  As evidence of support for the evolution of the law of charitable trusts, the Court 
sought to agree with views of Hammond J in DV Bryant Trust Board v Hamilton, where his 
Honour stated:144 
 
It would be unfortunate if charities law were to stand still: this body of law must keep abreast 
of changing institutions and societal values.  And, it is to New Zealand institutions and values 
that regard should be had.  This is not,  of course, to say that “new” heads of charity will be 
allowed to spring up  overnight without close scrutiny; rather (adapting some pertinent words 
from the preface to the Book of Common Prayer) Courts should, in appropriate cases be 
prepared to entertain adjustments “to things once advisedly established”.  That philosophy of 
necessity mandates a cautious approach, and one which will usually proceed by analogy; but 
neither does it set its face against change to what is considered to be charitable, in law. 
 
The dictum of the Court in the Greenpeace appeal case reflects the very real challenge being 
placed firmly at the feet of New Zealand’s courts – that of acknowledging the ever-changing 
status of the law of charity, whilst being bound by the shackles of the common law.  Australia 
has broken free of these constraints, for the reasons set out in this article, and in doing so, 
planted the seeds of change within the jurisprudence of New Zealand.   The Court is clearly 
supporting the ethos of change where appropriate, thus providing evidence that the seeds of 
change are germinating here in New Zealand, which echoes the early Australian 
jurisprudence.  So whilst outwardly New Zealand does not support eschewing the political 
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purpose doctrine, it is showing inward signs of legitimising the eventual possible rejection of 
the doctrine. 
 
Turning to the matter of the objects of Greenpeace that were at issue for the Court, the Court 
was of the view that the amendments made by Greenpeace to the two controversial objects 
“will remove the element of political contention and controversy inherent in disarmament 
generally”145 and instead, would then “constitute…an uncontroversial public benefit 
purpose.”146  So in other words, the Court explicitly applied the test from Molloy, where the 
Court is not required to determine wherein the public good lies because it is self-evident as a 
matter of law.147  The public benefit would be achieved in a number of respects.  Firstly, in 
recognition of New Zealand’s international obligations as a signatory to the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty, therefore a similar approach should be adopted in the Greenpeace case 
where promotion of nuclear disarmament would be for the public benefit. 
 
Secondly, the promotion of nuclear disarmament is in accordance with domestic law and is 
enacted in the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone Disarmament, and Arms Control Act 1987, 
whose purpose is to, inter alia, promote and encourage an effective and active national 
contribution to the essential process of disarmament.148 
 
Thirdly, successive New Zealand governments have confirmed their intentions to support the 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 1968, which reflects overwhelming 
national public opinion.149 
 
Fourthly, the reference in object 2.2 to “the elimination of all weapons of mass destruction” is 
consistent with national treaty and statutory obligations, therefore the Court was able to 
accept that the amended clauses were within the fourth head of charity, that of any other 
purpose beneficial to the community, and there could be no grounds for holding them outside 
the spirit and intendment of the Preamble of the Statute of Elizabeth. 
 
Therefore, whilst the Court acknowledged the reality that change is a natural occurrence for 
the jurisprudence of charitable law, it still fully relied on the historical doctrines set out in the 
case of Molloy, suggesting therefore that New Zealand is still fully entrenched in the annals 
of charitable trust history.  However, this may not be strictly accurate.   
 
The Court in the Greenpeace appeal case did clearly state that charitable trust law should 
recognise that the promotion of peace through nuclear disarmament and the elimination of 
weapons of mass destruction as a charitable purpose under the fourth head of charity, thus 
reflecting a clear evolution in charitable trust law.  The fact that the Court was able to utilise 
and apply adequately the historical doctrines to be able to support this novel charitable 
purpose suggests therefore that there is perhaps no requirement after all to propagate the 
changes so embraced in the Australian jurisprudence, because New Zealand’s approach is 
still admirably sufficient to be able to determine accurately public benefit in such 
controversial issues.   
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In relation to the amended object 2.7 submitted by Greenpeace, the Court was of the view 
that advocacy was intended to be merely ancillary and not independent from Greenpeace’s 
primary charitable purposes, thus it would meet the requirements of s 5 of the Act.150 
 
The result of the appeal to the Court of Appeal by Greenpeace has been mixed in terms of 
proving judicial clarity.  On the one hand, the Court provided evidence that the political 
purpose doctrine is still firmly entrenched and the Court was perfectly able to determine 
public benefit, even in controversial circumstances, without the need to reject the political 
purpose doctrine.  On the other hand, it is clear that the path of Greenpeace through the 
courts has highlighted judicial disquiet regarding the contemporary requirement of the 
political purpose doctrine.  Perhaps therefore New Zealand is on the path to giving itself 
permission to allowing the doctrine to be rejected if cases present more controversial issues 
than those that have done to date.  If such cases do not present themselves, then New Zealand 
is still at liberty to apply the political purpose doctrine. 
 
This is not, however, the end of the story.  The Court believed that the appropriate course of 
action was to exercise the power of the Court to refer Greenpeace’s application for 
registration to the chief executive and Board of the Department of Internal Affairs - Charities 
for reconsideration in light of amendments made to its objects and the findings of the 
Court.151  The Department of Internal Affairs - Charities is yet to release its deliberations on 
this matter. 
 
It is undeniable that the path of the Greenpeace case through the courts has been rocky. This 
article highlights criticisms that could be levelled at the lack of overall certainty provided in 
the High Court in determining this case, and the lack of willingness by the Courts to follow 
the contemporary approach of Australia, and whilst the Court of Appeal has provided 
evidence that whilst change can be welcomed, it is still restrained from adopting a more 
liberal approach.  However, this does not necessarily mean that, as a matter of law, the 
jurisprudence of New Zealand is stultified.  The Judges were constrained by earlier decisions 
and these cases are “evidence of the proper processes for common law development in New 
Zealand.”152  If such changes are to occur, then it would be for a case to overrule that of 
Molloy in a superior court, which the Court of Appeal was not prepared to do in Greenpeace 
of New Zealand Incorporated.  Interestingly, Greenpeace has successfully launched an appeal 
to the Supreme Court on the matter of public benefit.  This appeal may then yet provide a 
determinative answer as to whether the courts are prepared to over rule the application of 
Molloy and Bowman in New Zealand that underpin the doctrine of political purpose. 
 
Nonetheless, as it stands, whilst there is clearly evidence that there is no stultification of the 
common law as a matter of law, it may be argued that the decisions of Re Draco and 
Greenpeace “have the practical effect of stultifying the common law’s development in this 
area”153 because organisations that wish to take advantage of charitable status may be 
dissuaded from advancing cases through the court system due to high costs or indeed because 
of the inevitable publicity that would eventuate from such processes.   
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There is no answer to the matter of publicity, however, Heath J in the High Court case of 
Greenpeace may have gone some way to alleviate any concerns over costs because his 
Honour did not follow the usual rule that the successful party should be awarded costs, 
because there were issues of public importance.154  Should further cases arise citing issues of 
equal public importance, New Zealand courts could choose to follow this precedent.     
 
Whilst it is clear that New Zealand is tentatively receptive to expanding their jurisprudence 
on political activity and charitable trusts, it is also clear that they remain cautious about 
whether New Zealand really should also scythe away the annuals of charitable trust common 
law and follow in the wake of their Tasman cousin.  The Court of Appeal case of Greenpeace 
admirably shows that new charitable purposes should be accepted and are not in discord with 
historical methods of applying the traditional laws, and only time will tell as to whether the 
Supreme Court will follow that same approach. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The opening remarks of this article asked can, and indeed should, New Zealand continue to 
follow the traditional jurisprudence in light of the sea changes created by its antipodean 
cousin.  In attempting to answer to that question, one must look to the evolution of the 
jurisprudence.  It is evident that from the nineteenth century in England, the judiciary were 
planting the early seeds of the exception to charitable trusts, that of political activities, 
although it was not until the now iconic case of Pemsel that the seeds began to germinate 
fully throughout the English jurisprudence.  The English courts adopted a wide interpretation 
of the term “political purpose”, and as a result, it could encompass many activities carried out 
by organisations including trusts that furthered the interests of political parties; trusts that 
sought to procure changes in national and international laws, and trusts that sought to procure 
a reversal of national and international government policy or particular decisions of 
government authorities.  Whilst English courts adopted a wider interpretation with 
enthusiasm, Australian jurisprudence was more reticent in its adoption of the political 
purpose doctrine, and case law shows that Australian courts, even from early on, had begun 
to follow a diverging path from their Tasman and European cousins.    
 
In a number of cases prior to the ground-breaking Aid/Watch, the Australian judiciary 
expressed concern that political purpose had its roots in uncertain footing,  and that such 
heritage led to its being vague and indefinite.  Australia therefore was clearly endeavouring to 
plough its own furrows of jurisprudence and in doing so, it adopted a more restrictive 
interpretation of the political doctrine, meaning that trusts that may fall foul of the wide 
interpretation of the doctrine in England and Wales would actually be construed as charitable 
in Australia.   However, the process of planting a new jurisprudence has not necessarily been 
a smooth undertaking for the Australian courts, as reflected in the journey through the Courts 
of the case of Aid/Watch, eventually ending in the High Court of Australia, where at last, the 
harvest that undermined the application of the Bowman line of authority in Australia bore 
fruit.  Whilst it is evident that discord still exists in Australia, as reflected in the majority 
decision of the High Court in Aid/Watch, it is evident that Australia has now firmly 
established this contemporary jurisprudence. 
 
New Zealand did not have to wait long for the effects of the Aid/Watch to be felt, and the case 
of Re Draco was the first to test how fertile the jurisprudential grounds of New Zealand 
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would be to plant the seeds of change in Aotearoa.  Young J was clear that the Bowman line 
of authority was still good law in New Zealand, although his Honour did mention that New 
Zealand’s own system of governance may preclude the type of political agitation as discussed 
in Aid/Watch from being applicable in New Zealand, and indeed, Aid/Watch may only in fact 
be applicable in cases that relieved poverty.  Unfortunately for New Zealand however, his 
Honour refrained from expanding further on these matters, thus leaving perhaps more 
questions than answers as to whether New Zealand may yet prove fertile grounds for a 
contemporary approach to political activities and charitable trusts.  The case of Greenpeace 
proved equally frustrating in terms of clarifying whether changes may be on the horizon in its 
journey through the courts, although the Court of Appeal has shown that old laws and new 
principles can sit comfortably alongside one another without too much apparent discord, thus 
suggesting that whilst the seeds of change may have been planted, New Zealand sees no 
value yet in tending that harvest. 
 
My view is that it is not necessary for New Zealand to move away from its traditional path.  
The issues of public and private benefit have been readily resolved155 by the Charities 
Commission, and the Courts, and supported by the Charities Act 2005,156 and whilst there is 
indeed limited contemporary common law, this does not necessarily mean that charity law in 
New Zealand is being stultified by lack of legal development.  Australia based its Aid/Watch 
decision, in essence, on its system of political governance, which has not proven to be of 
merit, nor relevance, in New Zealand.  Decades of case law supports the continuing of the 
status quo in New Zealand.  I, for one, however, eagerly await the response from the 
Department of Internal Affairs – Charities in relation to their reconsideration of the 
registration of Greenpeace in light of the Court of Appeal judgment, and the appeal by 
Greenpeace to the Supreme Court. 
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